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ABSTRACT
Negative emissions technologies (NETs), especially bioenergy with carbon capture and
storage and direct air capture and storage, have been invoked as necessary to achieve
the aspirational 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement. However, currently their costs are
estimated to be very high, NETs do not seem to offer co-benefits besides mitigating
climate change and there are significant concerns regarding possible negative
impacts of their large-scale implementation on sustainable development. Costs can
vary significantly due to locational factors such as availability of biomass resources
and geological storage capacity. It will be up to progressive industrialized countries
to take first steps to mobilize the mitigation potential of NETs.
In order to understand whether NETs can provide a significant contribution to
mitigation, financial incentives are needed that allow implementing the most
attractive NET activities at the global scale. We see the market mechanism under
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement – colloquially called ‘Sustainable Development
Mechanism’ – as a possible cornerstone of such a policy instrument. While initially
NETs will not be competitive on the free market, the mechanism can facilitate
bilateral financial transfers for NETs, where mitigation units accrue to the financier.
We discuss the functions and design elements that an international policy
instrument may need to fulfil to successfully mobilize NETs. This includes in
particular robust quantification of removed carbon under international oversight
and preventing social and environmental conflicts particularly on land and water
use by NETs to ensure long-term acceptability.
Key policy insights
. International policy instruments that mobilize negative emissions technologies are
inexistent despite most mitigation pathways relying on large-scale NETs
implementation later this century.
. Feasibility of NETs at large-scale is highly uncertain due to high expected costs and
political economy challenges. Practical experience is necessary for better
understanding feasibility.
. For cost-effective global deployment of NETs, a policy instrument would need to
mobilize international financial flows and implement safeguards concerning
sustainable development impacts.
. The sustainable development mechanism established in Article 6.4 of the Paris
Agreement could be a good basis for this if it includes a robust approach to
evaluating sustainable development impacts building on the sustainable
development goals.
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1. Introduction
International climate policy is at a crossroads. The Paris Agreement’s target to hold warming to ‘well below’ 2
degrees and pursue efforts towards a 1.5-degree limit (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 2) means that the remaining
carbon budget is severely limited (Horton, Keith, & Honegger, 2016; Millar et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2016).
Given current global emission trends and projections for the implementation of GHGmitigation policies, aggres-
sive deployment of so-called negative emissions technologies (NETs) is needed to meet the Paris Agreement
targets (Geden, 2015; IEA, 2016), not least that of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees, which is of particular interest
to this article. It is questionable, however, whether Parties, in agreeing to that target, willingly committed to the
future deployment of NETs. These technologies remain very costly and are largely untested (Geden, 2016) and
political support of the constituent technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) has been lacklustre
(Lipponen et al., 2017).
In this article, we view the potential deployment of NETs as a subset of wider climate change mitigation pol-
icies, in that the issues surrounding them partly resemble those associated with conventional mitigation, but
they also come with additional challenges. The NETs that we focus on include bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air capture and storage (DACS),1 although we acknowledge that
other technologies or practices might emerge. We identify design considerations for a potential international
policy instrument that would incentivize the development of such NETs at large scale with a view to achieving
the 1.5-degree target.
First, we summarize why NETs are needed to achieve any scenario for 1.5 degrees. Then, we assess the econ-
omics of BECCS and DACS, and potential future cost reductions in these technologies, to better understand the
levels of financial incentives necessary in the short, medium and long-term to mobilize NETs. This is followed by
an analysis of wider political economy barriers to deploying NETs. We then put forward design considerations
for a proposed international policy instrument on NETs, and we discuss where it could be placed in the archi-
tecture of the Paris Agreement, focusing on the Agreement’s so-called Sustainable Development Mechanism
(Article 6). We then develop suggestions for the governance of such a policy instrument, and in particular
propose strengthening sustainable development assessments and voluntary payment of a NETs premium to
overcome the lack of near-term competitiveness of NETs in comparison to already ongoing mitigation
activities.
Our methodology is based on a review of the literature, applying concepts of economics and political
science as well as practical experience from the history of mitigation technology deployment and
development of the international climate policy regime. To our knowledge, it is the first attempt to combine
these approaches and disciplinary perspectives to derive policy recommendations for mobilizing NETs under
the Paris Agreement.
2. The need for scaling up NETs to keep the 1.5-degree target in reach
NETs represent a unique subset of climate change mitigation measures. They can complement technologies that
lead to emissions reductions and thus help bend the curve of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Regardless of
whether the remaining future global emissions budget to stay on a 1.5-degree-compatible path is 165 Gt
CO2 at the beginning of 2017 as suggested by the IPCC’s fifth assessment report (IPCC, 2014; Le Quéré et al.,
2016), or 915–1980 Gt as postulated by Millar et al. (2017), at a current emissions level of 50 Gt/year, this
budget is used up within the next few decades at most.
Only by full decarbonization of all economic activity within one generation or less (Rogelj et al., 2015) would
there remain a small chance at reaching the 1.5-degree target without NETs. The only other alternative would be
the still poorly understood and highly controversial geoengineering option solar radiation management (SRM)
(Nicholson, Jinnah,& Gillespie, 2017, NRC, 2015a; Pasztor, Scharf, & Schmidt, 2017; Royal Society, 2009).
Once CO2 emissions and CO2 sequestration reach the same level (as expressed by the Paris Agreement’s
wording in Article 4.1 to reach a ‘balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by
sinks’), any additional deployment of NETs can lead to an actual reduction of atmospheric CO2 concentrations
(Honegger, Sugathapala, & Michaelowa, 2013). Without NETs, scenarios of ‘overshoot and decline’ of
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atmospheric GHG concentrations (such as Azar, Lindgren, Larson, & Mollersten, 2006; Kriegler et al., 2014; Peters,
2016) are virtually impossible.
The scale of NETs foreseen in such scenarios is mindboggling. Removals would have to reach 10–20 Gt CO2
per year, with eventual cumulative volumes of 444–1000 GtCO2 by 2100 (Boysen, 2017). To illustrate the chal-
lenge, removing 10 Gt CO2 annually through BECCS would mean increasing power generation capacity from
biomass tenfold to 1000 GW (see EIA, 2017 for current capacity) and equipping all these plants with CCS
technology.
How could NETs be scaled up to a billion-ton scale within two to three decades? Such a dramatic expansion
would rival or exceed past record-breaking transformations in the energy sector, such as the rollout of nuclear
power in France with capacity increasing by 42 GW in the 1980s (EIA, 2017), or the scale-up of coal-fired capacity
in China by about 600 GW in 1990–2015 (EIA, 2017; Torvanger, Lund, & Rive, 2013).
A massive deployment of NETs as suggested by the scenarios outlined above will only be possible if the NETs
are economically attractive, or with the introduction of policy instruments that can make NET deployment
attractive by generating revenues linked to the amount of CO2 captured and safely stored.
2 We will look at
each of these issues in turn in the sections below.
3. The economics of NETs
Integrated Assessment Model scenarios see a steep increase of mitigation costs over time and thus view NETs as
necessary for cost-optimal paths to cap warming at 1.5 degrees (Peters et al., 2017). How does the situation look
in the short and medium term?
To answer this question, we explore the individual technology elements of BECCS and DACS that incur costs
and generate returns. We also discuss how geographical factors are expected to influence regional differences in
these costs. Our analysis starts from a situation in which there are no financial incentives for the service of
removing and storing carbon. We therefore focus on the other cost and revenue elements to identify how
high these carbon removal incentives would need to be in order to render NETs economically attractive.
3.1. The anticipated economics of BECCS
While there are several options for technical processes summarized under the term BECCS, they all comprise the
following basic steps: Biomass production, processing into fuel or electric power, and CO2 storage. The costs of
BECCS accruing along this chain of processes are seen from the perspective of the plant operator and include
the investment in the power plant or biofuel production facility; the capture and storage infrastructure, general
operating and maintenance costs; the cost of biomass production; and the transportation of biomass to the
plant as well as transportation of CO2 to a sequestration site. Potential revenues would include the sale of elec-
tricity, fuel or heat and waste-processing fees (Azar et al., 2010; Muratori, Calvin, Wise, Kyle, & Edmonds, 2016).
Costs are expected to vary geographically owing to different kinds of biomass sources as well as storage
options. Biomass waste from forests and agricultural or industrial processes is available in limited quantities,
but is likely to be lower cost (Boysen et al., 2017). Dedicated agricultural energy or forest crops could theoretically
generate large quantities, but this would incur higher costs, especially if indirect effects on food production are
taken into account (Azar et al., 2010; Kato & Yamagata, 2014; Smith et al., 2015). Bioenergy power plant as well as
CO2 capture costs depend on the plant size and are thus intricately linked to the biomass supply potential. A non-
negligible part of costs involves the high energy demands of capture and storage processes. The cost of CO2
transport and storage depends on the availability of suitable geological formations on land or under the
seabed, but also on the purity of CO2, which again depends on the biomass input (Fajardy & Mac Dowell,
2017). For example, under ideal conditions, the costs of capturing and storing CO2 from sugarcane fermentation
and sugarcane bagasse flue gas could be around $50/tCO2 (IEA GHG, 2011; Moreira, Romeiro, Fuss, Kraxner, &
Pacca, 2016), whereas most other BECCS processes are estimated to be costlier: The review of existing research
by Kemper (2015) finds that most studies see BECCS operating at costs of $50–$150/tCO2. While Luckow, Wise,
Dooley, and Kim (2010) estimate that significant volumes of BECCS would occur at costs well below $100/tCO2,
they also find that, in order to equip over 90% of new bioenergy plants with CCS, a carbon price in excess of
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$150/tCO2 would be needed to cover the costs. However, any estimates of future operating costs are rough
approximations, given that BECCS is still at an exploratory stage (IPCC, 2014). Power plant technology as well
as CCS costs are expected to decrease over time due to technology learning, potentially leaving the cost of
biomass as the largest variable cost element. Once large-scale BECCS leads to greater scarcity of land and
water resources, indirect costs due to competition with food and other crops over land or water will rise
significantly.
The economics of BECCS over time therefore appear to be essentially driven by two conflicting forces: (i) econ-
omies of scale, where technology learning and mass production can reduce costs of power plants, capture
equipment, transport and storage infrastructure, and (ii) resource scarcity, where increasing biomass demand
causes rising operating costs especially when biomass supply cannot be increased easily. An equivalent
effect would relate to the availability of storage sites. The latter effect should not be underestimated once
BECCS is scaled up to deployment levels anticipated in global models.
Global scenarios compatible with cost-effective achievement of the Paris targets suggest that comparable
amounts of bioenergy may be sourced from agriculture and forestry by-products, as opposed to dedicated
energy crops (Azar et al., 2010), which would require land on the order of several hundred million hectares,
or about a third of global croplands (NRC, 2015b).
Such large-scale BECCS deployment would have significant effects on food prices. Muratori et al., (2016, p. 1)
have shown that, in a world that has a carbon pricing level set to achieve an ambitious temperature target, the
carbon price and biomass and food crop prices are directly related, and the availability of BECCS (and CCS more
generally) would actually reduce ‘the upward pressure on food crop prices by lowering carbon prices and low-
ering the total biomass demand in climate change mitigation scenarios’. So, despite BECCS competing with food
production, food prices could actually experience less pressure in scenarios that include BECCS applications
compared to those that do not – if ambitious temperature targets are to be met (Muratori et al., 2016).
3.2. The anticipated economics of DACS
DACS is a group of technologies all of which are currently at laboratory scale. A process to capture CO2 from
ambient air via biological, chemical or physical processes would need to be combined with CO2 storage
(NRC, 2015b).
The economics of DACS differ from BECCS in that the primary resource needed is electricity rather than
biomass. This means that the full CO2 benefit will only accrue if the production of that electricity does not gen-
erate GHG emissions. A DACS plant running on high-carbon power would likely result in a regional increase of
emissions rather than the intended negative emissions (Socolow et al., 2011). Even if the electricity used for
DACS is zero-carbon, indirect effects on electricity production elsewhere need to be considered.
The costs of DACS include the air capture infrastructure cost, the cost of power to operate this equipment,
and transport and storage costs. Transport costs could be kept low if the DACS plants are sited on top of storage
sites; this could be done if sufficient renewable electricity is available near the storage sites. Cost estimates are
even less reliable than those of BECCS, as air capture technologies have not yet been tested at large scale and
the number of studies in the public domain is substantially smaller compared to BECCS. Current estimates of full
DACS costs range from $400 to $1000/tCO2 (NRC, 2015b).
Costs of DACS are thus exceedingly high compared to classical mitigation options. How far technology learn-
ing can reduce the cost of DACS, remains to be seen. Given that huge volumes of air need to be moved to extract
a small volume of CO2, the potential for cost reduction seems limited.
3.3. Costs of NETs and mitigation alternatives over time
Given that the current costs of BECCS and DACS are orders of magnitude above costs of classical GHG mitigation
options, they are highly unattractive under current conditions. This is accentuated by the likely lack of obvious
co-benefits besides mitigation. Whereas conventional mitigation action – done unilaterally or with international
climate finance – is regularly motivated by non-climate-related co-benefits (such as health improvements), it is
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rather unlikely that, for example, adding a CO2-storage component to a bioenergy plant would result in highly
visible co-benefits.
The upscaling of mitigation ambition would bring in higher-cost options, such as measures in the transport
sector where mitigation costs frequently exceed 100 USD/tCO2e (IPCC, 2014, p. 604; Solano Rodriguez, Drum-
mond, & Ekins, 2017), at which point some NETs would arguably become more attractive options. Such
trends could result in cost developments as shown in Figure 1 below, provided that policymakers are willing
to introduce policy instruments that would cover the respective mitigation costs.
BECCS costs would initially fall as the technology matures, and rise again as the resource scarcity of biomass
(and to some extent storage) kicked in. DACS costs would decrease steadily provided sufficient renewable elec-
tricity could be procured near storage sites. Classical mitigation costs are expected to increase continuously from
current levels as ‘low-hanging fruit’ are depleted and given the necessary increase in ambition compared to
current mitigation action. The resulting ‘scissors’ – falling NETs costs combined with rising classical mitigation
costs - could close some time in the second half of this century. All values considered are orders of magnitude
above current levels of carbon pricing (World Bank, Ecofys & Vivid Economics, 2016), which means that decisive
policy measures would be required to trigger mitigation at such cost levels.
Figure 1 shows that the case for wide-scale deployment of NETs becomes compelling only in the long term
even presuming a willingness to pay for increasingly costly mitigation. Moreover, this assessment does not yet
include non-economic factors, which we consider in the following section.
4. The difficult political economy of NETs
Economics are not the only factor that determine the deployment of a mitigation option. History shows that
public perceptions of, as well as interest group struggles and preferences for (or against), certain technologies
could have a major impact on the feasibility of NETs. We focus here on existing technologies, namely, biomass
use for fuel and electricity production, and CCS, both of which have been promoted as mitigation technologies
and which form the building blocks of key NETs. Therefore, these emissions reduction technologies are well-
suited to illustrate the political economy challenges that prominent NETs are likely to face in terms of public
acceptance and potential resource competition. The design of any policy instrument needs to take into
account these experiences in addition to the economic costs of the NETs.
Additionally, discussions on NETs have been dominated by concerns over their presumed scale and associ-
ated risks, in particular where they have been framed as ‘geoengineering’ (Scheer & Renn, 2014). We thus start
with a reflection on the role of perceptions as well as interest groups in the political economy of NETs before
looking at the lessons that can be drawn from the specific cases of bioenergy and CCS.
Figure 1. Development of costs of BECCS, DACS and classical mitigation over time assuming strong political will to cover mitigation costs.
Note: Curves are indicative.
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4.1. The role of perceptions
The images or analogues that the public and key stakeholders find most evocative with regard to each of the
NETs will have an impact on their likely acceptability and prospects for wide-scale deployment. Some terms that
have to date been used are relatively neutral (e.g. ‘backstop technology’) or hopeful (e.g. ‘Plan B’), whereas many
others are dismissive, derisive or otherwise negative (e.g. ‘unicorn’, ‘dead end road’, ‘magical thinking’, or ‘moral
hazard’) (Anderson & Peters, 2016). Focussing the conversation on the gradual rollout of a specific technology
such as BECCS and advancing research (including on its distinct social, environmental and political dimensions)
would emphasise the limited contribution of NETs and move away from largely negative framings of NETs as
‘large-scale technological interventions’ (Caviezel & Revermann, 2014). A focus on research and the first
plants would help clarify that NETs do not offer a ‘silver bullet’ or ‘get out of jail free card’ and reveal real-
world challenges, e.g. in terms of technological development, costs or limiting factors such as resource conflicts
or local opposition (Buck, 2016). There is some fear that research on NETs would crowd out funding of other
relevant climate technologies. However, given the minimal attention paid to NETs outside of modelling
circles to date, and the possibility that they could contribute meaningfully, though to a lesser extent than
some scenarios suggest, to addressing the challenge, we argue that virtually any RD&D into NETs using realistic
assumptions could have a significant social payoff.
4.2. Interest groups and their positions
BECCS will face stiff opposition from established stakeholders in the power sector if they fear that regulations
would impose additional costs on themselves. However, industry stakeholders may come to view NETs favour-
ably, if they offer greater flexibility in reaching mandated emissions limits by compensating for emissions else-
where. If NETs reached a certain scale, new interest groups such as producers of NETs technologies would
emerge. These would then increasingly seek to influence policies and market conditions to enhance demand
for NETs and to maximize profits. At the same time, environmental NGOs are likely to highlight potential
environmental and social risks. A key interface with the wider public will be transport and storage, since that
is the part of the CCS infrastructure closest to most residents (Ashworth, Wade, Reiner, & Liang, 2015). In the
case of BECCS, transport of the biomass into the plants may additionally act as a source of tension (van der
Horst, 2007). Whether one of these groups will dominate or whether a healthy equilibrium will be found
cannot be forecast at this point in a credible manner.
4.3. Insights from bioenergy
The experience of biofuels (Sorda, Banse, & Kemfert, 2010) demonstrates some of the political economy chal-
lenges of BECCS. The recent history of biofuels shows rising concerns over competition with existing food
crops associated with the rapid increase in biofuel production in the early to mid-2000s and environmentalists’
concerns over the sustainability of the biomass being harvested (Tilman et al., 2009). The debate came to a head
in 2007–8 as global food prices were rising along with concerns over deforestation and impacts on endangered
species (notably orangutans in Borneo). Political attention in the food–fuel debate was most protracted in
various European countries. Other countries such as China also backpedalled from ambitious proposals to
rollout biofuels in the face of concerns over food security. By contrast, in countries where there already were
significant levels of biomass production, and food security could be retained, such as Brazil or Thailand, the pol-
itical dynamics were different – there is continued support for ever-growing levels of biofuels still today.
The environmental impacts of biofuels were debated from the start. Conversion of existing ecosystems in
Brazil, Southeast Asia, and the United States to crop-based biofuels were seen as running the danger of releasing
‘17 to 420 times more CO2 than the annual GHG reductions that these biofuels would provide by displacing fossil
fuels’ (Fargione, Hill, Tilman, Polasky, & Hawthorne, 2008).
Technological attempts to resolve these conflicts – for example, by turning to particular crops such as Jatro-
pha Curcas that could be grown onmarginal land – have had limited success. One study, for example, found that
Jatropha was neither profitable nor in the interests of poor local populations (Ariza-Montobbio, Lele, Kallis, &
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Martinez-Alier, 2010). Further, concerns over ‘land grabs’ by government agencies, agribusiness or sovereign
wealth funds further eroded the reputation of biofuels (Cotula, 2012).
The denouement of traditional biofuels in Europe happened remarkably rapidly: In 2007, Jean Ziegler, UN
special rapporteur on the right to food at the time, stated that biofuels might result in increased hunger. He
decried the ‘ill-conceived rush’ to convert food crops into biofuels as a ‘crime against humanity’ (Ferrett,
2007) and called for a five-year moratorium on expanding biofuels (UN News Centre, 2007). By late 2008, the
European Parliament voted to cut the target for the share of biofuels in the EU transport sector from 10 to
5%. This vote however never became law. In 2013, the European Parliament voted to limit the use of conven-
tional land-based biofuels in the European transport fuel mix to 6% and to report on indirect emissions caused
by land-use change. The final nail in the coffin for first-generation biofuels in Europe came in 2014 as the more
ambitious transport sector targets were removed post-2020. Instead, a nominally lower target was set, but one
based on tighter sustainability standards that prevented counting traditional biofuels towards the 2030 target,
and pointed the way towards the development of biofuels still being driven by regulatory targets, but at a
slower-than-expected pace addressing environmentalist concerns. This experience indicates a clear limit to
the political potential of biofuels and could foreshadow political reluctance in Europe towards BECCS, particu-
larly if close attention is not paid to the links between wider sustainability considerations and deploying
BECCS at scale.
Aside from biofuel use in transport, the complementary histories of bioenergy power plants and biorefineries
have also revealed entrenched opposition in some locations, provoking significant concerns from local citizens
(van der Horst, 2007; Upreti, 2004). However, in regions that are more heavily reliant on bioenergy, public senti-
ment has tended to be more supportive (Kortsch, Hildebrand, & Schweizer-Ries, 2015) since it is associated with
perceived benefits to the local stakeholders. In other cases, bioenergy development has been linked to pro-
blems with past environmental damages associated with prior industrial policy (Eaton, 2016).
The biofuel and bioenergy power cases show that political economy considerations can be an obstacle to
deployment of mitigation options, but that support, or opposition, is not necessarily universal or homogenous.
Certain contexts and participatory approaches with involvement of various local stakeholders have led to
greater likelihood of support.
4.4. Insights from CCS
Carbon capture at large CO2 point sources (such as fossil-fuel power plants) combined with CO2 transport and
geological storage can provide essential insights for BECCS, as both share capture, transport and storage pro-
cesses and the challenge of requiring large-scale storage reservoirs for CO2. Much like the shorter history of
NETs, the theoretical need for CCS deployment was clear from mitigation scenario development before the
first policy discussions on this technology took place (Krey, Luderer, Clarke, & Kriegler, 2014). The IPCC’s Fifth
Assessment Report (2014) found that constraints on deployment of CCS would more than double the global
costs of meeting a 450 ppm target. Omitting CCS is far costlier than constraints on other low-carbon options
because of its potential versatility in addressing emissions from existing power plants and industrial processes,
for which there are few other attractive alternatives.
Implementation of CCS has been slow and stymied by a lack of adequate policy frameworks and correspond-
ing funding (Reiner, 2016). Reiner and Herzog (2004) found that local opposition often impedes progress if not
proactively addressed by an inclusive and transparent decision-making process and benefit-sharing. The first
large-scale (>1 million tonnes/year) CO2-storage facility began operations over twenty years ago at the Sleipner
field in the North Sea. However, it was not until 2015 that the first commercial-scale power plant equipped with
CCS began operation at Boundary Dam in Saskatchewan, Canada. Other recent large-scale projects include the
Petra Nova power plant in Texas, Emirates Steel in Abu Dhabi and a coal-to-liquids facility in China. These all rely,
to differing degrees, on revenues from enhanced oil recovery. Although other projects such as Tomakomai in
Japan or Quest in Alberta, Canada, have not relied on revenues from CO2 utilization, it is notable that the suc-
cessful early projects relied on a constellation of commercial factors to incentivize projects, rather than on, say, a
voluntary commitment to climate action or dedicated public funding.
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Despite the slow pace of deployment of CCS, there are valuable lessons to be learned from both its successes
and failures. From 2010 to 2017, the number of operational large-scale CCS projects rose from fewer than 10 to
just over 20, with the annual CO2 capture capacity of operational projects more than doubling to 40 Mt (Global
CCS Institute, 2017). Yet at the same time the number of projects in the pipeline has halved from 77 to 38. The
reasons for projects being shelved include local opposition (e.g. in Germany and the Netherlands), political
opposition (e.g. Futuregen in the US), cost overruns, and technological problems (e.g. Kemper County in Missis-
sippi). Many of these dimensions are of course interrelated: project economics are, for instance, frequently chal-
lenged by unexpected technological difficulties or by local protests prolonging costly planning processes.
In Europe, onshore storage, in particular, has led to protests in Germany (e.g. Schleswig-Holstein has banned
CO2 storage after protests against several projects across the country) and the Netherlands (where opposition led
to the shutdown of the proposed Shell project at Barendrecht and then extended a moratorium to all onshore
storage) (Ashworth et al., 2012; L’Orange Seigo, Dohle, & Siegrist, 2014; Terwel, ter Mors, & Daamen, 2012). By
contrast, in North America, the economic value associated with enhanced oil recovery has led to interest in
using the revenues from CO2 sales to oilfields to help support project economics (Herzog, 2011; Reiner, 2015).
Reiner and Herzog’s (2004) finding that early failures could irreparably damage the standing of CCS is
especially pertinent, since reaching large-scale NET application requires starting with a few pioneering installa-
tions, the success or failure of which will have a far greater impact on the fate of NETs than later ones.
Given the potential for resource conflicts in addition to the general difficulty of establishing novel technol-
ogies, effective policy instruments are not, in themselves, sufficient to ensure the smooth rollout of a technology,
but rather they are a necessary pre-condition. We turn to these considerations in the next section.
5. Design considerations for an international policy instrument to mobilize NETs
In this section, we introduce three key considerations relevant for how to design an international policy instru-
ment that would help mobilize NETs: (i) the scale of the financial incentives needed; (ii) the differentiation of
financial contributions between countries at various stages of development; and (iii) the need for economic flexi-
bility in mobilizing NETs in a least-cost manner.
5.1. Financial incentives
As shown in Section 3 above, a major challenge for NETs is their dependence on high and continuous payments
to cover capture and storage costs. For BECCS specifically, another cost component would be the differential
between electricity production costs using biomass and the costs of alternative power generation technologies
with which the BECCS plant is competing. No private entity would cover these costs without direct government
intervention. On a national level, this support could take various forms: direct carbon pricing through a carbon
tax, emissions trading, provision of subsidies or technology mandates (IPCC, 2014, chapter 13).
As shown by the World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics (2016), currently over 75% of emissions covered by
carbon pricing instruments are facing prices below $10/tCO2e. In a few countries, notably Sweden, Switzerland,
Finland, and Norway, carbon pricing exceeds $50/tCO2e – a level which could theoretically be sufficient to
mobilize some of the (limited) least-cost BECCS options. At the moment at least, the political will to increase
carbon prices for mitigation without demonstrated co-benefits beyond this level does not exist even in the
most ambitious jurisdictions. So, at current prices, NETs will not be implemented. If NETs are to play a relevant
role in the medium to long term, governments will need to increase carbon prices, or subsidy levels will need to
be very high, at least initially to stimulate learning, much as has been the case for renewables such as solar or
offshore wind.
Given the existence of varying carbon pricing policy instruments at the national level, and highly variable
costs of BECCS and DACS according to plant location, it is crucial to develop an international policy instrument
that incentivises NET deployment, regardless of where it takes place. Otherwise, there might be a few jurisdic-
tions where high-cost NET implementation would happen, whereas in other jurisdictions, low-cost NET options
would not be implemented because there is no possibility to cover even these lower costs.
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5.2. Industrialized countries to take the lead on funding NETs
Wealthier and more advanced countries are generally expected to take the lead in mitigation and support
poorer, developing countries in their efforts.3 Given the high costs of NETs, this would mean that at least the
initial financial stimulus to mobilize NETs needs to be introduced by rich countries (Füssler et al., 2015). Poor
countries that install NET plants would benefit from direct transfers (‘climate finance’) or get revenue from
the sale of carbon credits. As these countries get richer, they are increasingly expected to also introduce
carbon pricing and ramp it up over time.
A credible mechanism to mobilize NETs will require high levels of support from rich countries sustained over
decades. Experience with government tenders to purchase carbon credits abroad (e.g. in Norway, Sweden or
Switzerland) indicates that the public is sensitive to potential sustainability co-benefits or potential harm
caused by such transactions. This sensitivity has led many programmes to select only very specific, reputable
activities abroad (Dransfeld et al., 2017). In recent years, this tendency has resulted in more and more project
types being side lined (Hoch et al., 2015). Eventually, costs of NETs need to fall dramatically and carbon
credit demand will have to increase by several orders of magnitude to enable NETs to fully compete in a
market mechanism (see Figure 1 and discussion below).
5.3. Economic efficiency of mitigation
As we have shown above, pursuing the 1.5-degree target requires mobilizing the full potential of mitigation
including NETs. International cooperation enables reduction of mitigation cost differentials between countries
and thus can increase the global efficiency of mitigation. This increased efficiency can help reduce overall costs
and/or enhance the ambition of global mitigation efforts.
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), market mechanisms have
been developed that allow carbon prices to function as an incentive for mitigation throughout the world,
even if there is no carbon pricing in a specific jurisdiction. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) introduced three
such mechanisms (UNFCCC, 1998). The Clean Development Mechanism (KP Article 12) allows mitigation projects
in developing countries to produce emission credits that could be used by industrialized countries to reach their
mitigation targets. Joint Implementation (KP Article 6) and International Emissions Trading (KP Article 17) allow
generation of emission credits through projects in industrialized countries and the direct transfer of emission
units between such countries.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement has defined two international market mechanisms: one regulated individu-
ally by participating countries (Article 6.2) and one subject to international rules and oversight (Article 6.4). The
latter is known as the ‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’ (SDM). As we argue below, the SDM could become
a ‘natural home’ for mobilizing NETs globally, given that it is subject to more stringent international oversight,
which seems important in view of the challenging political economy of NETs. Fundamental design questions,
however, need to be resolved to make the SDM operational. In the next section, we will discuss how the
SDM could be structured to enable the deployment of NETs, taking into account their high costs and difficult
political economy characteristics. As stated, our focus is on the international level, given that national and sub-
national policies to mobilize NETs can be introduced independently.
6. A possible approach to mobilizing NETs: the sustainable development mechanism (SDM)
We first outline the fundamental characteristics of the SDM as a market mechanism intended for voluntary inter-
national collaboration on mitigation under the Paris Agreement. We then specify the functions that the SDM
might need to fulfil to mobilize NETs. Finally, we describe how specific decisions could be taken in ongoing
negotiations to account for these functions so that the SDM would best be suited to mobilize NETs.
We are aware that both NETs as well as market mechanisms are contentious topics in international climate
policy, and as a consequence it might take several years until the SDM would be ready to host NET activities.
Given that NETs appear inevitable for reaching ambitious temperature targets, however, we think an approach
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through an international market mechanism is necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) for the reasons we
have given in the previous section.
6.1. The basic concept of the SDM
Under the Paris Agreement, national governments have defined their countries’ respective mitigation targets
through their NDCs, which are to be strengthened over time in five-year periods. Article 6 recognizes that
Parties may want to voluntarily cooperate on mitigation efforts. The SDM established in paragraph 4 of
Article 6 is to promote mitigation and foster sustainable development. Activities are to be authorised by parti-
cipating Parties and contribute to a reduction of emissions levels in the host Party, which can be used by another
Party to fulfil its NDC. The activities are to deliver overall mitigation in global emissions and paragraph 5 specifies
that the reduction can only be counted toward one Parties’ NDC. The rulebook that will specify the operating
procedures and institutional responsibilities of the SDM is still being written by the Parties to the Paris Agree-
ment (to be adopted at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 24 in December 2018). A plausible scenario,
however, is that the SDM would allow for voluntary transfers of mitigation units in return for payment of a
price for each tonne of CO2 of avoided emissions by the country that receives the units. In the logic of our pro-
posal, this could be expanded to analogously include payment of a price for each ton of CO2 removed. The
received units might then be counted towards the buyer country’s mitigation target or its climate finance
pledges. This would create the flexibility to fund mitigation activities including NETs outside of national
borders in a way that they contribute to the funders’ mitigation target.
6.2. Key functions that the SDM would need to fulfil in order to harness significant amounts of
carbon removal
Based on our assessment of the limited political attractiveness of NETs and their high costs, we identify the fol-
lowing as key functions that the SDM would need to fulfil if it were to mobilize significant amounts of NETs:
1. Harness financial transfers to mobilize the NET potential in countries that are unable to afford the costs of
NETs
2. Ensure credible quantification and accounting under the Paris regime
3. Provide an effective administrative process with limited transaction costs
4. Prevent social and environmental conflicts.
This list is likely not exhaustive. In the following section, we describe how each of these functions could be
achieved in the ongoing negotiations under the Paris Agreement.
6.3. Steps in negotiations that could help make the SDM fit for NETs
Each of the functions outlined above can be reflected in some form in the rules that are currently under nego-
tiation and scheduled to be finalized by the end of 2018.
1) Financial transfers to mobilize NETs: Given the limited attractiveness of NETs, it seems important that no
limits are placed on the use of mitigation units by the acquiring country. The SDM rules should not preclude
voluntary payments in addition to the market price: Given that, in the short-term, NETs would not be able to
compete on an international market with the cheapest mitigation options, governments willing to fund NETs
activities in other countries would need to pay a premium for NETs on top of the market price for mitigation
units. This premium could be offered via bilaterally-agreed transfers that cover NET-specific additional costs,
in the context of the framework for non-market mechanisms under Article 6.8.4 Over time, the most ambitious
NDCs might include a specific pledge to mobilize NETs, which could be operationalized in form of NET-premium
payments.
2) Credible quantification and accounting under the Paris regime: Credibly demonstrating the results of
activities is particularly important in the case of NETs due to their challenging political economy. This would
CLIMATE POLICY 315
require agreed and conservative methodologies to quantify CO2 removed by each activity and monitor whether
it remains in the storage site. As under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), methodologies could be pro-
posed both by market participants as well as by the body supervising the SDM to maximize the ability of various
institutions and companies to contribute. Methodologies for CCS already exist under the CDM, but their
approval took several years due to concern regarding the permanence of storage. They could be modified to
appropriately quantify negative emissions accruing from BECCS (Krüger, 2017). In order to be reliable, the
accounting approach would require a centralized registry and international oversight, similar to that under
the Kyoto Protocol. Proposals for robust accounting in view of different possible uses of mitigation units5 are
described in much greater detail elsewhere (Schneider, Broekhoff, Cames, Füssler, & La Hoz Theuer, 2017).
3) Effective administrative processes with limited transaction costs: The responsibilities of various enti-
ties involved in the SDM need to be defined to ensure effective administration. In order to prevent a loss of accu-
mulated experience (and thus valuable time), national project approvals could be done by the same designated
national authorities that performed this task under the CDM. The SDM supervisory body could be modelled on
the CDM’s Executive Board. The task of this body would, in this case, likely be the tracking of activities and trans-
actions, approval of innovative project types, as well as approval of the corresponding baseline and monitoring
methodologies.
4) No conflicts with sustainable development objectives: A robust and credible process for this – be it
voluntary or mandatory – is crucial but could prove very challenging, given countries’ historical reluctance to
accept international procedures and criteria for evaluating sustainable development impacts. Many countries
see this as violating national sovereignty and thus vigorously oppose any such procedures. There is an extensive
literature on the mixed successes of environmental and social safeguards under various climate policy instru-
ments (REDD+, NAMAs, the CDM, the voluntary carbon market and other areas) and it is crucial to learn from
these experiences (Arens, Beuermann, et al., 2015; Chhatre et al., 2012; Dransfeld et al., 2017; Olsen, 2007).
For example, the UNFCCC Secretariat has created a sustainable development assessment tool under the CDM
(Arens et al., 2014; Arens, Mersmann, Beuermann, & Rudolph, 2015), but it has been used only to a limited
extent. Specific safeguards have been considered mostly in the context of avoided deforestation (Kossoy
et al., 2015). The easiest approach has been for mitigation unit buyers to exclude certain activity types, which
are seen as not sufficiently aligned with sustainable development, but this has also proved controversial
(Füssler et al., 2015).
A principal reason for the mixed outcome has been the lack of a common understanding of what constitutes
sustainable development and how an activity’s sustainable development performance should be assessed.
However, the 17 goals and 169 targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) now offer an internation-
ally agreed normative framework against which sustainable development contributions can be measured ex-
post (Dransfeld et al., 2017; Honegger & Toussaint, 2017). Of course, the multi-dimensional nature of these
goals and proliferation of targets does mean that this will be a daunting challenge, particularly given the
complex potential interactions across goals and targets (Nilsson, Griggs, & Visbeck, 2016). Thus, a safeguard pro-
cedure would need to operationalize selected goals, targets and indicators of the SDGs in a way that addresses
key concerns over NETs (Fuso Nerini et al., 2017). Consistent application of such a procedure would likely be a
prerequisite to strengthening the acceptability of large-scale NET deployment among environmental NGOs and
local populations.
7. Conclusions and further research needs
Limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees requires large-scale deployment of NETs alongside conventional mitiga-
tion measures. Currently BECCS and DACS are more than an order of magnitude more expensive than current
mitigation technologies. However, with near-term political support, technology learning and innovation could
bring costs down over time, while other mitigation actions become more expensive, as cheaper options are
exhausted. If there is political willingness to pay for such expensive mitigation, NETs would eventually
become more competitive mitigation options. Any international policy instrument for mobilization of NETs
needs to allow for a NETs premium to render NETs economically viable in the near term until NETs can
compete financially with other mitigation options.
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Past experiences with CCS and bioenergy suggest that the political economy of NETs will be challenging. An
international policy instrument thus would need to transparently demonstrate the GHG impacts of NETs and
include safeguards to avoid social and environmental conflicts. Furthermore, it needs to be communicated
clearly that NETs are very unlikely to be scaled up rapidly even when adequate financial incentives are put in
place. Emphasizing the inherently gradual nature of NET rollout could attenuate some of the negative views,
and ultimately a popular rejection, of NETs.
We find that the SDM under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement could be the cornerstone for an international
policy instrument, if combined with a transparent assessment of sustainable development implications. Further-
more, some buyer-countries would have to combine acquisition of mitigation units with bilateral transfers that
provide an additional NET-premium as long as NETs cannot compete on a free market with other mitigation
options. This would allow the growth of competitive enterprises developing and operating NET activities.
Once increased demand for mitigation units results in a market price that enables NETs to compete with con-
ventional mitigation activities, NET deployment will be accelerated as a natural component of mitigation. For
BECCS, this could happen when the market price reaches $100–$150/t CO2, i.e. potentially around 2030. For
DACS, it would probably take much longer.
More research is needed to better understand the effects of resource scarcity in terms of land, water or power
(in the case of DACS), which are likely to result in competition with food production, general power needs or
other societal needs. Also, understanding of the political economy of NETs, especially the prospects for ensuring
popular support for their implementation, needs to be refined. Empirical evidence on public and stakeholder
attitudes needs to be collected (Braun, Merk, Pönitzsch, Rehdanz, & Schmidt, 2017), especially in locations
where the theoretical potential for NETs is substantial. It would be particularly helpful to learn the extent to
which stakeholders will invoke the same arguments as in the case of bioenergy and CCS, and whether these
would result in dogmatic opposition or allow deployment in cases where conflicts with sustainable develop-
ment can be resolved.
Ultimately, we need to understand whether the international community, in formulating mitigation
targets, can rely on the near-term and future availability of NETs at large scale. We need to avoid a situation
where decades could be lost waiting for NETs rather than pursuing more aggressive traditional mitigation
strategies that would attempt to achieve almost complete decarbonization in the 2020 and 2030s (Larkin, Kur-
iakose, Sharmina, & Anderson, 2017). A credible policy instrument channelling resources into NETs implemen-
tation at the most cost-effective locations worldwide would be an important stepping stone to understanding
whether NETs can help move the needle toward the 1.5-degree target, or whether they serve as a dangerous
distraction.
Notes
1. Please note that we use the term Direct Air Capture and Storage (DACS) as opposed to Direct Air Capture (DAC). This is to
prevent confusion with direct air capture of CO2 and utilization without long-term storage. For example, the Swiss start-up
Climeworks captures CO2 and uses it in greenhouses (Marshall, 2017). This does not result in negative emissions. While
NETs could also take the form of enhanced weathering (Taylor et al., 2015; Köhler, Hartmann, & Wolf-Gladrow, 2010) and
ocean liming (Renford and Henderson, 2017; McLaren, 2012), these technologies are still speculative and have not been
tested at scale. Afforestation (Grassi et al., 2017) and biochar (Woolf, Amonette, Street-Perrott, Lehmann, & Joseph, 2010),
while leading to ‘negative emissions’ relative to a counterfactual, are sometimes seen as part of ‘classical’ mitigation and
thus not covered in this article.
2. For NETs with revenues, the gap between costs and revenues would have to be covered.
3. The principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) has evolved
throughout the history of climate negotiations (Voigt & Ferreira, 2016). As a cornerstone of the international climate policy
system it is enshrined in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC and has entered the Paris Agreement with the qualifier ‘in light of different
national circumstances’ (Article 2.2).
4. In principle, all international financial payments for NETs could be undertaken under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement.
However, in such a case, no mitigation units could be transferred given the ‘non-market’ nature of Article 6.8. The limited pol-
itical attractiveness of NETs indicates that hardly any substantial international funding would be mobilized if there was no
possibility to help achievement of the donor countries’ NDC. We are therefore focussing on the SDM in our core proposal.
5. E.g. toward climate finance pledges, NDC achievement or development cooperation goals.
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